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Statements about the future are central in everyday conversation and reasoning.
How should we understand their meaning? The received view among philosophers
treats will as a tense: in ‘Cynthia will pass her exam’, will shifts the reference time
forward. Linguists, however, have produced substantial evidence for the view that
will is a modal, on a par with must and would. The different accounts are designed
to satisfy different theoretical constraints, apparently pulling in opposite directions.
We show that these constraints are jointly satisfied by a novel modal account of
will. On this account, will is a modal but doesn’t work as a quantifier over worlds.
Rather, the meaning of will involves a selection function similar to the one used by
Stalnaker in his semantics for conditionals. The resulting theory yields a plausible
semantics and logic for will and vindicates our intuitive views about the attitudes
that rational agents should have towards future-directed contents.
1. Introduction
Our topic is the semantics for statements about the future in English.
In particular, we focus on sentences involving the English auxiliary
will, such as:
(1) Cynthia will pass her exam.
Sentences like (1) are uniquely interesting. An account of their mean-
ing faces challenges from a number of philosophical domains: seman-
tics, epistemology, and metaphysics.
The semantic challenge is generated by a tension in the linguistic
behaviour of will. On the one hand, will has the characteristic marks of
a modal operator. On the other, will fails to display the standard scope
interactions of modals. For example, unlike must or might, will com-
mutes freely with negation. That is, ‘It will be the case that it doesn’t
Mind, Vol. . . 2017  Cariani and Santorio 2017
doi:10.1093/mind/fzw004
rain’ and ‘It is not the case that it will rain’ have the same truth
conditions, despite the difference in relative scope between will and
negation.
The epistemological challenge comes from the role of will-statements
in everyday thinking and deliberation. We are often uncertain about
the propositions expressed by will-claims, and at least sometimes this
uncertainty seems rational. An adequate account of will should assign
will-sentences contents towards which we do, and rationally may, have
attitudes of this sort.
The metaphysical challenge comes from considerations about the
open future. Past facts are settled, while at least some of the facts
about the future seem not to be. Both the claim that the future is
open and the nature of the relationship between the metaphysics and
the semantics of the future are disputed. But the following seems
uncontroversial: whatever the truth about the metaphysics, our se-
mantic theory should avoid ascribing widespread error to ordinary
speakers.
The existing literature is split between two general approaches,
roughly mapping onto the divide between philosophers and linguists.
Philosophers invariably treat will as a tense, i.e. an operator whose
semantic function is to shift the time of evaluation of a clause. This
view, often combined with a supervaluational account of the truth
value of will-claims, is well-positioned to accommodate the epistemo-
logical challenge and can be developed so as to meet the metaphysical
challenge. But it is problematic from a linguistic point of view. Most
linguists (though not all of them) treat will as a modal—i.e. as an
expression that manipulates a world parameter. Though typical modal
accounts of will are well-positioned to accommodate the linguistic
challenge, they flounder in the face of the epistemological challenge.
We propose a new theory of will that draws together elements from
these two views and improves on all existing accounts. Here is a sketch.
Following the dominant view in semantics, we hold that will is a modal.
But will differs from standard modals like must or may, which work as
quantifiers. The best analogy for will is the selection function meaning
that Robert Stalnaker uses in his semantics for conditionals. That is, will
selects a unique world from a distinguished set of worlds. Roughly, the
selected world is ‘the world instantiating the one actual complete course
of history ’, among the ones that are compatible with history up to now.
The approximate truth conditions of (1) are:
(2) In the actual complete course of history, Cynthia passes her exam.
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Hence our semantics presupposes that there is a ‘unique’ actual course
of history. At the same time, it might be indeterminate which possible
world instantiates the actual course of history. As a result, it might be
indeterminate which world will selects, and will-statements may have
indeterminate truth values. We make room for this combination of
views by distinguishing two levels of theorizing: on the one hand, the
compositional semantic analysis of will; on the other, the proper treat-
ment of the indeterminacy that (on some metaphysical views) affects
will-statements. These levels are often conflated. We think it’s crucial
that they be kept distinct. This yields a view that combines several
desirable features: (i) it yields a plausible semantics and logic for will;
(ii) it generates contents for will-statements towards which we can be
rationally uncertain; and (iii) it makes room for (though doesn’t re-
quire) the metaphysical claim that the future is open.
Here is an overview of the paper. In §2 we outline some plausible
constraints for a semantics for will. In §3, we give an informal over-
view of the account, which is stated in full in §5. (§4 spells out our
metaphysical assumptions.) In §6 we explain how to define a notion of
truth that makes room for indeterminacy. Finally, we check that our
account yields the desired logical and epistemological predictions
(§§7-8).
One last preliminary point: some uses of will have a so-called ‘vol-
itional’ reading, i.e. they work as injunctions to the hearer to bring
about the prejacent. For example, on its volitional reading (1) is an
injunction to the hearer to see to it that Cynthia passes her exam. In
this paper, we refrain from making claims about these uses, and about
their connection to the more ordinary future-directed uses.
2. Semantics for the future: three constraints
Any plausible account of will, we believe, ought to respect three
constraints.
2.1 The modal character of will
Our first constraint is that will should have a modal meaning. By this
we mean that will manipulates a possible world parameter,1 similarly
1 It doesn’t matter to our account whether this world parameter is assumed to be repre-
sented in the object-language via world variables, or in the metalanguage via an index coord-
inate. When stating our semantics, we choose the latter option.
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to modal auxiliaries like must or might. For example, here is a toy
modal meaning for will:
0will A1 is true at w and t iff for all worlds w 0 that are open possibilities at
w and t , A is true at w 0 and at some t 0  t
(For now, just take ‘open possibilities’ to be possibilities that, for all
that is settled at the time of utterance, might instantiate the future
course of events.) The modal view contrasts with a temporal view, on
which will manipulates exclusively a time parameter and no world
parameter. Again, for illustration, here is a toy temporal view:
0will A1 is true at w and t iff for some t 0  t , A is true at t 0 and w
To be clear: we understand the modal view as compatible with the
claim that, in addition to the world parameter, will manipulates a time
parameter. What distinguishes modal from nonmodal analyses is
whether will manipulates a world parameter at all.
The linguistics literature has provided three pieces of evidence for
the modal view. Taken together, they seem to us compelling.
The first piece of evidence is morphological. According to a widely
accepted view (Abusch 1997, 1998; Condoravdi 2002; Kaufmann 2005),
will shares morphology with the modal would. In particular, will and
would have in common a modal morpheme, often represented as
‘WOLL’: will is PRESENT + WOLL; would is PAST + WOLL. The assump-
tion of common morphology allows us to explain otherwise puzzling
semantic facts. For example, it explains why we can replace will with
would in indirect reports of past utterances of will-sentences. If, on
Tuesday, Harriet says ‘I will come to work tomorrow’, then on
Wednesday we would report Harriet’s utterance by saying ‘Harriet
said she would come to work today ’.
The second piece of evidence for the modal view is that will (on a
par with other expressions that normally induce future reference, like
going to) may have epistemic readings (Palmer 1987; Enc¸ 1996). These
readings generally require a stative predicate (like be) in the prejacent.2
Here is an example:
(3) John will be in London by now.
Notice two facts about (3). First, as is made clear by the modifier by
now, the prejacent of (3) has its reference time in the present. Hence,
at the time of utterance, it is settled whether John is in London.
2 Following common (and medieval) usage, we use the term prejacent to denote the clause
that will takes scope over.
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Second, in (3), will works as a marker of evidentiality: roughly, it
signals that the speaker is inferring John’s location on the basis of a
body of evidence. To see this, notice that (3) is infelicitous if uttered by
someone who is looking directly at John, even if both are indeed in
London. Both these facts are hard to explain on a purely temporal
view. By contrast, views on which the languages of uncertainty and
prediction are both modal in nature seem ideally placed to account for
the data.3
Third, as Peter Klecha (2013) has recently argued, will allows for
modal subordination. Roughly, modal subordination is the phenom-
enon whereby, in discourses containing several modals, earlier modals
may restrict the domain of later modals (Roberts 1989). As an ex-
ample, consider the following discourse:
(4) Jane might come to the party. Sally would come too.
The occurrence of would in the second sentence is naturally under-
stood as restricted to worlds where Jane does come to the party. A
natural explanation for this is that its domain of quantification is
somehow anaphoric to the worlds that witness the might-claim in
(4). Klecha points out that, similarly to would and other modals,
will-sentences can inherit restrictions from previous modal elements
of the discourse.
(5) If the supplies arrive tomorrow, it will be late in the day. They
will contain three boxes of cereal.
(6) The supplies might arrive tomorrow. It will be late in the day.
In this respect, will patterns with modals like might and would, and not
with tenses, like the past tense:
(7) a. If the supplies arrive tomorrow, it might be late in the day.
They might contain three boxes of cereal.
3 An anonymous reviewer challenges our claim that going to has the relevant present-dir-
ected readings. We agree that it is sometimes more natural to use will in these constructions.
However, our informants uniformly agree that both of the following sentences sound good in
the appropriate contexts:
(i) The swordfish is going to be ready now.
(ii) The swordfish is not going to be ready yet.
Given that present-directed going to can have a similar meaning as will, and given that the next
argument for a modal view does apply to going to, we think that there is about as much reason
for a modal analysis of going to.
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b. # If the supplies arrived yesterday, it was late in the day.
They contained three boxes of cereals.
(8) a. The supplies might have arrived yesterday. It would have
been late in the day.
b. # The supplies might have arrived yesterday. It was late in
the day.
These facts hold in languages other than English.4 This speaks against
a view that tries to accommodate the modal character of will by
claiming that the English will is ambiguous between a modal and a
nonmodal meaning. (More on this in §2.4.)
The evidence in favour of a modal view seems quite strong to us. At
the same time, not everyone finds it convincing.5 To motivate our
project, we don’t have to take the evidence to be definitive. All we
need is that it be strong enough to make the modal view a serious
contender.
2.2 Scopelessness
Our second constraint is that will is scopeless with respect to an im-
portant class of other linguistic items. By this we mean that changes in
the relative syntactic scope between will and these other items don’t
make a difference to the truth conditions of will-sentences. This is a
remarkable feature of will, and one that is not generally shared by
modal expressions.6
4 An anonymous reviewer suggests that Klecha’s modal subordination argument might fail
for Romance languages. According to the reviewer, in those languages, modal subordination
only obtains if will is translated in the conditional mood. This does not appear to be quite
right. We have surveyed nine Italian and two French informants, asking them to rate dis-
courses like (5)-(6), both in the indicative and conditional mood, and (7)-b and (8)-b. A large
majority of our informants accepts the translations of (5)-(6) with the future indicative
(though there is an overall preference for their variants in the conditional mood).
Moreover, and crucially, nearly all of them strongly prefer the future indicative variants
over the past tense variants, i.e. the translations of (7)-b and (8)-b.
5 Modal analyses are a majority among linguists, but not universally accepted. Arguments
against them are found in Comrie (1989) and Kissine (2008). In addition, von Stechow (1995)
extensively develops a nonmodal view. We believe that many anti-modal arguments can be
resisted: a good starting point is Portner’s (2009, pp. 239-40) critique of Kissine’s arguments.
6 The point is widely acknowledged in the literature, since at least Thomason (1970). See
also the discussion of excluded middle for will-sentences in Copley (2009) and of the inter-
actions between future operators and negation in MacFarlane (2014, p. 216).
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For present purposes, it is enough to observe scopelessness with
respect to negative items, as illustrated by:7
(9) a. It will not rain.
b. It is not the case that it will rain.
(9)-a and (9)-b are truth conditionally equivalent. The situation is
similar with different prejacents, and when clauses like (9)-a and
(9)-b are embedded in other environments. In short, will appears to
commute freely with ordinary English negation. This observation is
strengthened by considering items that lexicalize negation, such as
doubt (which, following common assumptions, we understand as be-
lieve that not) and fail: (10)-a and (10)-b are truth conditionally
equivalent:
(10) a. I doubt that Sam will pass his logic exam.
b. I believe that Sam will fail his logic exam.
For a comparison with an auxiliary that is not scopeless, consider
minimal variants of (10)-a and (10)-b that involve a deontic modal.
Suppose we’re talking about the obligations that Sam must fulfil in
order to stay enrolled in his degree. It is clear that (11)-a is not truth
conditionally equivalent to (11)-b:
(11) a. I doubt that [in order to graduate] Sam must pass his
logic exam.
b. I believe that [in order to graduate] Sam must fail his logic
exam.
The lack of scope interactions with negation immediately yields an
interesting logical constraint:
Will Excluded Middle (preliminary take): 0will A _ will not A1 is a
logical truth.
For now, we informally gloss ‘logically true’ as ‘true whenever
uttered’. In §7, we derive the validity of this schema, given our se-
mantics and two standard formal concepts of consequence.
7 Perhaps the scopelessness of will extends further. We think it is likely that will is scopeless
with respect to comparative expressions. (See the discussion of comparatives and conditionals
in Korzukhin 2014.) For reasons of space, we limit ourselves to considering negation.
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2.3 The cognitive role of future statements
Future-directed statements play an important role in our cognitive
economy. It is a platitude that ordinary agents are uncertain about
the future. Assuming that credences attach to propositions, it seems
natural to understand ‘being uncertain about the future’ as ‘having
non-extreme degrees of belief towards the propositions that are
expressed by will-claims’. Moreover, at least in some cases, these
non-extreme degrees of belief seem also rational. A semantics for
will should yield contents for will-claims that are appropriate inputs
to our theories of attitudes. For illustration, consider the following
case:
Sports Fan: Suppose that Cynthia comes to work each day wearing a
Warriors cap, a Giants cap, or no cap, depending on a random draw (with
each option having equal probability). You are certain that for each of the
three caps, it is an open possibility that Cynthia wears that cap tomorrow.
What degree of belief should you assign to the proposition that tomorrow
she’ll wear a Warriors cap?
Presumably ‘1/3’ is a rationally permissible answer. In some theoretical
settings, it may even be required: if some version of Lewis’s (1986c)
principal principle is a requirement of rationality and all your evi-
dence is of the admissible variety, ‘1/3’ would appear to be the only
rational answer. Similarly, it seems that the fair odds for a bet on the
truth of that proposition are 1 to 2.
These claims seem to be truisms, yet they are surprisingly hard to
vindicate on a family of existing semantics for will, i.e. modal ac-
counts. For illustration, consider the toy modal semantics mentioned
in §2.1. This theory treats will as a universal quantifier over the open
possibilities at the point of utterance. (This account captures what
Prior 1967 calls the ‘Peircean future tense’.)
The problem for this semantics is that if Warriors-cap futures and
Giants-cap futures are both possible, you should have zero credence in
the propositions expressed by each of (12) and (13):
(12) Cynthia will wear a Warriors cap tomorrow.
(13) Cynthia will wear a Giants cap tomorrow.
To see why the theory makes this prediction, recall that you are certain
that all the headgear options are open possibilities at the time of ut-
terance. It follows that you are certain that the truth condition for
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each of (12) and (13) does not hold.8 In the next section, we show that
virtually every theory that treats will as a universal quantifier faces this
problem.
2.4 Surveying the options
It is difficult to satisfy all three constraints. For one thing, the first two
seem to be in direct tension with each other. If will is a modal, as the
first constraint requires, we expect it to have nontrivial scope inter-
actions, in violation of the second constraint. And indeed, basic modal
analyses of will predict that switching the relative scope of will and
negation does have truth conditional effects. For illustration: on
Kaufmann’s (2005) account, will is a universal quantifier over
(roughly) the worlds realizing the most likely courses of future history.
On this theory, by switching around will and not, we get the two non-
equivalent readings:
will > not: all the most likely futures do not satisfy the prejacent.
not >will: not all the most likely futures satisfy the prejacent.
The linguistics literature offers attempts to reconcile the first two
desiderata. A prominent example is the modal analysis of Copley
(2009). Building on work by von Fintel on generics (1997), Copley
claims that will-sentences presuppose that their domain is homoge-
neous with respect to the prejacent. For an occurrence of will in a
sentence of the form 0will A1 to have a denotation, its domain must
contain only A-worlds or only ‰A-worlds. We have concerns about
the stipulative character of this proposal. But we can set them aside,
because Copley ’s theory, like all existing modal theories, runs into a
more basic problem: it fails to address our third constraint. The prop-
ositions that modal theories deliver are not propositions that we can
plausibly have non-extreme credences in.
8 In a similar spirit, Belnap et al. (2001, p. 160) object to the Peircean that there is a
difference between a bet that it will rain tomorrow and a bet that it is inevitable that it
will rain. One can win the former without winning the latter. Also, the problem is structurally
analogous to one that has recently received attention in the counterfactuals literature. (See
Hawthorne 2005; Edgington 2008; Moss 2013; Schulz 2014.)
Notice that the constraint we are discussing is not about cognition, but about the contents
that are the final output of the semantics. One may be sceptical about the connections between
possible worlds semantics and a theory of cognition. But it is standard to assume that com-
positional semantics should deliver contents that are suitable objects for propositional atti-
tudes. For example, classical models of assertion in semantics (e.g. Stalnaker’s 1978) assume
that contents of assertions and contents of attitudes may be represented via formal objects of
the same kind, and that the former may be used to update the latter.
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To see the problem, consider (1) again:
(1) Cynthia will pass her exam.
Despite their important differences, existing modal theories share a
common core. They treat will as a universal modal whose domain is a
subset of the set of worlds that are ‘open’ at the time of utterance—i.e.
worlds that, for all that is settled at the time of utterance, may capture
the future course of events. (More about this in §4.) This subset con-
sists of the worlds that are maximal relative to a contextually supplied
ordering. Individual accounts contribute different interpretations of
the ordering. The domain might consist of the maximally likely open
worlds (Kaufmann 2005), or of the maximally normal open worlds
(Copley 2009), or of the worlds that maximally match the speaker’s
knowledge (Giannakidou & Mari 2015) (to mention only a few of the
available options). The resulting truth conditions for (1) are:
(1) is true iff, for all w s.t. w is one of the best open worlds, Cynthia passes
her exam in w.
Suppose, however, that you are certain that Cynthia’s passing or fail-
ing the exam are both represented within the set of best open worlds.
Suppose, that is, that Cynthia passes her exam at some best open
worlds and fails it at some others.9 In this case, existing modal
views require that your credence in (1) be zero. On those views, (1)
says that all the best worlds are worlds where Cynthia passes, while
you’re certain that in some best worlds she passes, and in some others
she doesn’t. But this prediction is obviously wrong. You ought to (and
generally do) assign positive credence to the content expressed by
(1)—witness the fact that you should (and would) be disposed to
accept at least some bets on it.
Copley ’s (2009) assumption that the domain is presupposed to be
homogeneous with respect to the prejacent does not help here. On this
view, (1) suffers from presupposition failure in the scenario we have
described. It is unclear what credence, if any, one should assign to the
content of a sentence in a context that violates the sentence’s
9 Arguably, plenty of natural language cases fall in this category. Here is one that seems
uncontroversial to us. Suppose that coin tosses are genuinely indeterministic, that there is a .5
chance that the coin that you’re going to toss will land tails, and that you believe this. Then
consider:
(i) The coin I’m about to toss will land tails.
The set of closest worlds used to evaluate (i), by any of the metrics used in the literature, will
presumably include both heads- and tails-worlds.
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presuppositions. It seems both irrational and unusual to assign them
ordinary positive credences. For instance, consider the proposition
expressed by ‘The King of France is bald’. It seems irrational to
assign positive credence to that proposition while also being certain
that France is not a monarchy. And indeed, ordinary agents have no
temptation to do so. By contrast, it is routine for agents to assign
positive credences to will-claims in situations of uncertainty about the
future. Hence the contents delivered by existing modal theories of will
are inadequate.
Let us now peek quickly at the philosophical literature. By far the
most popular view among philosophers is what Prior calls ‘Ockhamist
semantics’. Ockhamists don’t ascribe any modal character to will. For
them, ‘It will rain’ is true (in a world w and at time t) if and only if
there is a moment tþ in the future course of w (i.e. after t) such that it
rains (in w and at tþ). (Context might further narrow the interval
during which tþ is situated.) The obvious problem with Ockhamism
is its inability to satisfy our first desideratum. The Ockhamist has no
story about the relationship between will and would, about predictive
uses of will, or about modal subordination.
It might appear that classical supervaluationism is an exception to
this pattern. Classical supervaluationists (e.g. Thomason 1970, 1984;
Belnap & Green 1994) complement the Ockhamist semantics with the
idea that a sentence like (1) is true simpliciter just in case it is true at
the time of utterance in every open future. But supervaluationism is
not a modal theory in the sense that matters to us here. Though it has
a modal element, this element is not distinctive of the lexical entry for
will, but appears in the ‘global’ definition of truth. For this reason,
classical supervaluationism is unable to account for the evidence for a
modal treatment of will we summarized in §2.1. This is not to say that
supervaluationist theories are entirely on the wrong track. Our own
account brings together a modal analysis of the compositional contri-
bution of will with a supervaluationist-inspired picture of indeterminacy.10
One final option is to claim that will is ambiguous between a modal
and a nonmodal meaning. The modal meaning explains why will
seems to satisfy the first desideratum. The nonmodal meaning explains
why it seems to satisfy the second and third desiderata. We won’t
10 There are also important points of contact between the present theory and the selection-
based account of conditionals in branching time in Thomason & Gupta (1980). In addition,
Todd (2016) has recently defended a variant of the Ockhamist view on which all unsettled will-
claims are false (see also Schoubye & Rabern 2016 for criticism of Todd’s view). We defer a
direct comparison between our theories to future work.
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attempt a full refutation of the ambiguity option; but we notice that it
has two major disadvantages. First, it systematically over-generates.
For example, it predicts a true and a false reading for:
(14) The probability that Cynthia will wear a Warriors cap is 0.
(14) is true on the modal meaning and false on the nonmodal mean-
ing, so we should be able to hear it as true. Perhaps there are man-
oeuvres to be made to block this reading, but we leave it to the
ambiguity theorist to explain what they are. Second, an account of
will that does not exploit ambiguity seems obviously preferable on the
usual grounds of simplicity and theoretical unity. So, by giving an
account of will that satisfies all desiderata we provide an indirect ar-
gument against the ambiguity view.
3. Overview: selecting the future
We present our full account of will in the next few sections, but it is
helpful to illustrate the central ideas without the formalism. We start
by adopting some (but not all) of the insights associated with branch-
ing time frameworks. At every moment in time, we suppose, there are
multiple possible histories that fully coincide with respect to the past
and diverge with respect to the future. As time passes, histories that
had previously coincided up to a point part ways, ‘making true’ dif-
ferent courses of events. In diagram form:
This picture is often combined with substantial metaphysical claims
about the nature of possible worlds and the indeterminacy of the
future. Importantly, our account is neutral between the main
Figure 1
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background options. (We clarify this in §4.) All we need is that, given
any world w and time t , we can determine the historical alternatives to
w at t . Here is how we do it:
Two worlds w and v are historical alternatives at t iff w and v match
perfectly in their history (i.e. iff they match perfectly in matters of
particular fact) up to t .
The notion of a perfect match in matters of particular fact is borrowed
from David Lewis (1979a, 1983). Two worlds that perfectly match in
matters of particular fact up to a certain point in time are duplicates—
indiscernible copies of each other—up to that point.11
Note that our definition of historical alternatives involves no refer-
ence to a notion of openness. This is key to our later vindication (§4)
of the claim that our semantics is neutral about the open future
hypothesis.
Now, consider again (12), repeated here:
(12) Cynthia will wear a Warriors cap tomorrow.
As a first step, we assume that will is a modal. Like all modals in
natural language, it is interpreted against a background set of possi-
bilities. Following Kratzer’s terminology (1977, 1981a, 1991b), we call
this set the modal base. For the particular case of will, the modal base
in a given context is the set of historical alternatives to the world of the
context, at the time of the context. For example, in the scenario we
described, the modal base of (12) includes worlds where Cynthia wears
a Warriors cap, worlds where she wears a Giants cap, and worlds
where she wears no cap. In diagram form:
Figure 2
11 We think that a metaphysical notion of duplication, like the one we just invoked, is clear
enough to put to work in defining the modal base of will. This follows Lewis (1979a), who
deploys it in his official statement of the criteria for similarity used in counterfactual seman-
tics. Alternatively, one may define a notion of indistinguishability based on a canonical lan-
guage, as in Thomason (1984). We do not need the extra flexibility afforded by Thomason’s
notion.
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Standardly, the modal base is the domain of quantification of the
modal. But, as we anticipated, our account is not quantificational.
Instead, we propose that will singles out one world within the
modal base, and evaluates the prejacent at that world. Intuitively,
the selected world represents the ‘way things will actually be’—in
other words, the historical alternative that will actually be realized.
So, (12) is true just in case, in the selected world, Cynthia wears a
Warriors cap tomorrow.
The explanation for the scopelessness of will (and consequently the val-
idation of will-excluded middle) flows immediately from the fact that the
prejacent is always evaluated relative to a single world. (See §7.)
Our semantics for will presupposes that, at the time of utterance,
there is a unique, fully specified way things will actually be. (In the
jargon introduced by Belnap & Green 1994, this is the assumption that
there is a ‘thin red line’ that marks the complete course of actual
history.) This assumption is controversial. Theorists in the branching
time tradition object that, in the context of future-directed discourse,
we have no right to speak of ‘the way things will actually be’, or of ‘the
actual world’. On the one hand, it might be that the future is open—
that there is no fact of the matter, at the current time, about what way
things will turn out. On the other, even if the future is not open, it is
not clear that a semantics for natural language can legitimately pre-
suppose a metaphysical claim of this sort.
Even if one agrees with these concerns, we don’t think that the
compositional semantics for will needs to be changed. We distinguish
what information is needed by the compositional semantics from what
information the world is able to supply. We assume that the compos-
itional semantics requires as input a unique world of utterance. Like
all parameters used in semantic computations, the value of this par-
ameter is supplied by the context. At the same time, we leave it open
that it may be indeterminate what context the utterance takes place in,
and hence which world is supplied to the semantics.
Figure 3
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For illustration, consider again (12). Perhaps, at the time of utter-
ance, it is indeterminate whether the actual world is a Warriors-cap-
world, a Giants-cap-world, or a no-cap-world. If so, it is indetermin-
ate which context the utterance of (12) takes place in. The context
might be the context of Figure 3, or it might be a context in which
some other world (for example, v, as in Figure 4) is selected.
Let us highlight an important point. We grant that it may be inde-
terminate which world an utterance takes place in; moreover, we said
that the modal base of will is determined as a function of the world
and the time of the context. But it doesn’t follow that the modal base
of will is indeterminate. The reason is that, given the way that we have
defined historical alternatives, all worlds that are candidates for being
the world of the context have the same historical alternatives. So we
will be able to speak of the modal base of will in a context, even if it is
indeterminate what context the utterance takes place in.
The next few sections execute the plan we just sketched. §4 specifies
some metaphysical background. §5 presents our compositional se-
mantics, including an analysis of will-conditionals. §6 elaborates our
treatment of indeterminacy; §7 shows how our account yields the
logical and linguistic predictions we identified; §8 shows how our
account yields appropriate predictions about the cognitive role of
will-statements.
4. Metaphysical background
Our account is neutral on a number of metaphysical issues connected
to branching. In this brief section we explain how.
First, supporters of branching time often claim that possible worlds
literally share initial temporal segments. (See e.g. Thomason 1970;
Belnap & Green 1994; Belnap et al. 2001.) The point at which two
worlds branch is the point at which the initial segment ends. By con-
trast, opponents of branching argue that worlds with identical his-
tories up to a point are qualitatively identical, but still have no parts in
Figure 4
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common. (See e.g. Lewis 1986a.) We understand the claim that two
worlds w1 and w2 are historical alternatives at a time t as the weak
claim that there is a perfect match between matters of particular fact
between w1 and w2 up to t . This is compatible both with genuine
overlap and with mere indistinguishability.
Second, the branching framework is often associated with the claim
that the future is ‘open’. The relevant contrast here is with past events,
which are taken to be fixed in a way in which the future is not. There
are a number of ways to explain the relevant concept of openness.
Following Barnes & Cameron (2009), we choose one that is noncom-
mittal between different metaphysical theses
Openness: (at least some) contingent facts about how things will be
are presently unsettled.
Some writers (for example, Belnap & Green 1994) adopt Openness as
the starting point of the enterprise of giving a semantics for will.
Others (like MacFarlane 2003, 2008, 2014) take it as a methodological
desideratum that a semantics for the future should not decide between
different metaphysical options about Openness.
We are not committed to any of these claims. Unlike Belnap and
Green, we don’t assume Openness. Our apparatus is compatible with
both Openness and its denial. Unlike MacFarlane, we don’t endorse
the neutrality of the semantics as a methodological constraint. As it
happens, however, our semantics for will does turn out to be meta-
physically neutral about Openness—in the sense that both the de-
fender and the opponent of Openness are able to use it. The reason
is that we separate the design of the compositional semantics from the
account of indeterminacy. As a result, both the supporter of Openness
and its opponent can adopt the compositional meaning we assign to
will. They will diverge on whether they accept the suggestion that it is
indeterminate which context an utterance takes place in. (See §6.) But
we do not claim that the metaphysical neutrality is, in itself, a reason
to accept our account.
5. Semantics
5.1 Setup
Let us start by introducing some notation. We use italicized capital
letters (‘A’, ‘B’, etc.) as metalinguistic variables over sentences; and
boldface letters (‘A’, ‘B’, etc.) as metalinguistic variables over sets of
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worlds. We use ‘propositions’ and ‘sets of worlds’ interchangeably, but
everything we say is meant to be compatible with theories according to
which propositions merely determine sets of possible worlds, without
being identical to them.
As is standard in semantics, we define an interpretation function of
the form,
½ ½ parameters;g
Such a function assigns truth values compositionally to sentences
relative to a series of parameters and an assignment function, conven-
tionally denoted by ‘g ’. (The latter is just a function that assigns ob-
jects to syntactic indices, and is needed to handle variables.) Different
theories employ different parameters. The interpretation function is
also relativized to a context, but to remove clutter we avoid explicit
mention of the context unless strictly needed.
We also make some specific assumptions about will. First, will is a
sentential operator, i.e. an operator that takes a full clause as argu-
ment. This is a simplification, but one that is harmless given our
purposes. Second, as we flagged in §3, will takes as argument a
modal base, i.e. a set of worlds that are used for the interpretation
of the modal.12 In particular, the modal base of will is the set of his-
torical alternatives to the world of the context. Syntactically, we
assume that modal bases are the semantic values of covert pronouns
that work as arguments of modals. We represent these pronouns as ‘fi’,
and their values, sets of worlds, as ‘Fi’. For shorthand, we generally
represent modal bases in LFs just as a subscript of modals; hence we
write ‘willf ’ rather than the more extended ‘will [f ]’.
5.2 Semantics for will
Our semantics for will is based on an extended analogy with
Stalnaker’s (1968) semantics for conditionals.13
12 This understanding of modal bases is slightly simplistic. Modal bases are officially func-
tions from worlds to propositions. (See von Fintel & Heim 2011 for discussion.)
13 After finishing this paper, we discovered that the idea that will has a selection semantics
is also briefly entertained in a recent paper by Kratzer (2016). Schulz (2014) has recently
defended an interesting variant of Stalnaker’s semantics. Roughly, conditionals quantify over
a set of worlds, but they also select (via a choice function) an arbitrary world within that set.
We lack space for a full comparison here. Let us just state without argument or development
that, on the most natural implementation, building the analogy with Schulz’s system rather
than Stalnaker’s would require us to consider indeterminacy at the level of the compositional
semantics, which we are reluctant to do.
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As in Stalnaker’s semantics, we assume that the interpretation of
will involves appeal to a selection function, denoted by ‘s’. A selection
function maps a pair of a world w and a proposition A to a ‘selected’
world w 0. Intuitively, s selects the world w 0 that is ‘closest’ to the
starting world w while at the same time verifying proposition A.
For the case of conditionals, and counterfactuals in particular, there
is much literature on how exactly the metric of closeness should be
construed.14 We don’t need to settle these issues here. We can adopt
any of the metrics that have been proposed for counterfactual
conditionals.15
Selection functions are characterized by two important constraints:
. Inclusion: if A is non-empty, s w;Að Þ 2 A.
. Centering: if w 2 A, s w;Að Þ ¼ w.
Inclusion says that the world selected must verify the input propos-
ition (provided that some world does verify the input proposition).
Centering says that, if the input world verifies the input proposition,
then the world selected is the input world itself. Inclusion and
Centering are the only constraints we impose on selection functions,
which can then be defined as follows:16
A function s : W  P Wð ÞW is a selection function iff
i. if A is non-empty, s w;Að Þ 2 A, and
ii. if w 2 A, then s w;Að Þ ¼ w.
At this point, we’re ready to state the meaning of will. We assume that
interpretation is relativized to three parameters:17 a world of evalu-
ation w, a selection function s, and an assignment g .
(15) willf A
  w;s;g¼ 1 iff A½ ½ s w;g fð Þð Þ;s;g ¼ 1
To simplify the notation, we will just write F instead of g f
 
through-
out the paper.
14 For some sample proposals concerning the metric of closeness for counterfactuals, see
Lewis (1979b); Kratzer (1981b); Hiddleston (2005).
15 As will soon be evident, the choice between different metrics only matters for will-con-
ditionals. All we need to settle the selected world in all other cases is the centering condition.
(See below.)
16 Stalnaker imposes some extra constraints on selection functions. We leave it open
whether these extra constraints should apply to will; nothing hinges on these for our purposes.
17 Recall that, to avoid clutter, we omit the context parameter.
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Let us make some comments about this compositional semantics.
First, the basic effect of will is to shift the world at which its pre-
jacent is evaluated. This feature is shared with standard semantic ac-
counts of modals in natural language, like must. The difference is that
modals usually introduce quantification over the world of evaluation
parameter, while will replaces the world of evaluation with another
one picked via the selection function.
Second, the entry in (15) does not reflect any temporal shift. It is
easy to introduce temporal shift, letting will quantify existentially over
times. (Accordingly, interpretation is relativized to an extra parameter
for times.)
(16) willf A
  w;t;s;g ¼ 1 iff 9t 0  t; A½ ½ s w; Fð Þ;t 0;s;g ¼ 1
This said, throughout the discussion we stick to the entry in (15). This
is mostly for simplicity. The central innovation we introduce is the
appeal to selection functions. Other elements of the meaning of will
can stay in the background. Moreover, there are reasons to think that
a full-blown semantics for will exploits time in a way that is more
complex than simple existential quantification over temporal in-
stants.18 So the account in (16) would need update and clarification
anyway.
Third, this semantics has an interesting consequence for unem-
bedded occurrences of will: as it turns out, will is semantically vacuous
with respect to the modal parameter. Recall that the modal base of will
defaults to the set of historical alternatives to the world of the con-
text.19 Furthermore, the initial world of evaluation defaults to the
world in which the utterance takes place.20 Hence, when will is unem-
bedded, the world that works as the input to the selection function is a
member of the modal base. In this situation, the centering assumption
entails that the world returned by the selection function is always the
18 In particular, as argued by Abusch (1998) (see also Condoravdi 2002), it seems that our
best semantics for tense should quantify over intervals rather than instants. In the context of
this theory, the semantic effect of will (as well as of other modals) would not be to shift the
time of evaluation, but rather to extend forward the time interval at which the prejacent is
evaluated. (For a proposal in this vein, see also Kaufmann 2005.)
19 It might be valuable to consider a variant of our semantics that assigns to will an
epistemic modal base. We do not do so here, but for another account of the future on
which will has a partly epistemic meaning, see Giannakidou & Mari (2015), who discuss the
case of Greek and Italian.
20 This is via the definition of truth at a context, which fixes the value of w to the world of
the context. See §6 for details.
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world of evaluation itself. Thus, in its unembedded occurrences, will
merely ‘overwrites’ the world of evaluation parameter with itself.
(17) willf A
  w;s;g ¼ 1 iff A½ ½ w;s;g ¼ 1
Thus, when will occurs unembedded, our semantics effectively col-
lapses on the simple Ockhamist semantics, which treated will as a
mere tense.
Why bother, then, with the complexities of our selection function
semantics? There are many good reasons. They mainly relate to the
fact that, on our account, will has a modal base. This opens up the
possibility of accounting for will-conditionals (adopting the popular
assumption that will-clauses function as restrictors), modal subordin-
ation (via anaphoric links between the modal bases of the different
modals), and epistemic readings (by assuming that the modal base can
have different flavours). The selection function account also allows for
a vindication of the will-would connection.
Giving a full-fledged account of all these phenomena would take
too long. But below we give a brief sketch. Even from these remarks, it
should be clear that our account provides the tools for vindicating the
modal character of will.
5.3 Applications
5.3.1 Conditionals and modal subordination
A selection function semantics for will allows for a natural account of
will-conditionals. This also provides the tools required for an account
of modal subordination.
Following a longstanding tradition (see e.g. Lewis 1975; Kratzer
1991a, 2012) we assume that the function of if-clauses is to restrict
modal bases—to rule out of the modal base the worlds that are in-
compatible with them. (This effect is modelled by intersecting the
modal base with the set of worlds individuated by the if-clause.)
There are many ways to implement this semantic effect. Building
on work on quantifier domain restriction by Kai von Fintel (1994),
we choose a simple one that dovetails well with our assumption
that the object-language syntax contains a variable referring to the
modal base. Nothing hinges on this particular choice of
implementation.
We assume that if-clauses work as assignment shifters (similarly to
lambda-binders in a system in the style of Heim & Kratzer 1998). At a
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syntactic level, if-clauses are co-indexed with the relevant modal base
variable. For example, the LF of (18) is in (19):
(18) If John goes to London, he will meet with Matthew.
(19) [If John1 goes to London]4 willf4 [he1 meet with Matthew].
At a semantic level, conditionals are interpreted via a rule that in-
structs us to perform assignment shift, mapping the modal base vari-
able to a set of worlds determined by intersecting the old modal base
with the proposition expressed by the antecedent. Formally:
(20) If A
 
MODALf B
   w;s;g ¼ MODALf B
  w;s;g f!F\A½ 
(recall that F¼g(f ) and A¼fw : A½ ½ w;s;g ¼ 1g)
To illustrate this, consider again (18). Given modal base F, let g be the
assignment that coincides with g except at index 4, which is mapped
to the set of worlds in F at which John goes to London (i.e.
g ¼ g ½4 ! F \ John goes to London  ]. Then we predict:
(21) 18ð Þ½ ½ w;s;g ¼ willf4 he1 meet Matthew½ 
  w;s;g
Informally, and simplifying, the resulting truth conditions of (18) are:
(22) 18ð Þ½ ½ w;s;g ¼ true iff John meets Matthew at v, where v is the
world that is selected when s is given as input the set of the
historical alternatives (to w) where John goes to London.
Notice that the selected world need not coincide with the actual world
or with the world of evaluation. In particular, for any w such that John
does not go to London at w, the world selected by s taking w as input
must be different from w itself. In this case, our Stalnakerian seman-
tics and semantics in the Ockhamist tradition diverge.
This treatment of conditionals also yields a straightforward account
of modal subordination. Consider again Klecha’s example:
(5) If the supplies arrive tomorrow, it will be late in the day. They
will contain three boxes of cereal.
We can predict the relevant interpretation of (5) by assuming that the
modal base variables associated with the two occurrences of will are
co-indexed:
(23) If the supplies arrive tomorrow, it willf3 be late in the day.
They willf3 contain three boxes of cereal.
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The antecedent if the supplies arrive tomorrow shifts the value of the
relevant index. But, given co-indexing, both occurrences of will are
interpreted in the scope of the relevant supposition.21
5.3.2 The will-would connection
Our treatment of will also allows us to vindicate the morphological
connection between will and would. The precise nature of this con-
nection depends on one’s views about the meaning of would.
On the one hand, if one assumes a Stalnakerian semantics for
would, then the connection is immediately vindicated: will and
would turn out to have exactly the same meaning—modulo differences
in what possibilities are in the modal base in the two cases. Of course,
Stalnaker’s semantics for would, and in particular the principle of
Conditional Excluded Middle that it entails, are controversial. But,
first, notice that all the arguments that we gave above for the scope-
lessness of will carry over to the case of would. Moreover, the literature
has provided plenty of further arguments in support of Conditional
Excluded Middle. (See e.g. von Fintel & Iatridou 2002; Williams 2010;
Klinedinst 2011.)
On the other, the connection is not straightforward if one adopts a
Lewisian semantics for would. In this case, one will have to explain
why will deploys a selection function while would has universal quan-
tificational force. While this is a nontrivial task, a selection function
account of will is better placed to fulfil it than an Ockhamist
semantics.
5.3.3 Epistemic readings of will
Recall the example we used to introduce epistemic readings of will:
(3) John will be in London by now.
Will in (3) is not used to talk about the future, but rather has an
epistemic reading. Predicting how and when will receives an epistemic
reading goes beyond the scope of this paper. These questions connect
to general phenomena in the semantics of modality, and its relation-
ship with tense and aspect, that we can’t cover here.22 But we do want
21 We assume that the effects of the shift operated by the conditional antecedent extend
beyond the boundaries of individual sentences. An assumption of this sort seems required by
any account of modal subordination.
22 For some relevant discussion, see Condoravdi (2002); Condoravdi & Deo (2008); Khoo
(2015).
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to note an interesting analogy between will and other modals con-
cerning the availability of epistemic and non-epistemic readings.
It is well-known (see, for example, Condoravdi 2002) that the ref-
erence time of the prejacent correlates with the flavour that is assigned
to the modal. In particular, prejacents with a reference time in the past
or in the present correlate with epistemic readings, while prejacents
with a reference time in the future correlate with non-epistemic read-
ings. Here are some examples:
(24) a. John must be in London by now. (3epistemic/ #deontic)
b. John must go to London tomorrow. (#epistemic/
3deontic)
(25) a. Cynthia must be wearing a cap today. (3epistemic /
#deontic)
b. Cynthia must wear a cap tomorrow. (#epistemic/
3deontic)
(26) a. Sam must have gone to Chicago last April. (3epistemic/
#deontic)
b. Sam must go to Chicago next April. (#epistemic/
3deontic)
We note that will is similarly asymmetric:
(27) a. John will be in London by now. (3epistemic/#historical)
b. John will go to London tomorrow. (#epistemic/
3historical)
(28) a. Cynthia will be wearing a cap right now. (3epistemic/
#historical)
b. Cynthia will wear a cap tomorrow. (#epistemic/
3historical)
(29) a. Sam will have gone to Chicago last April. (3epistemic/
#historical)
b. Sam will go to Chicago next April. (#epistemic/
3historical)
Of course, if we are right, there are significant differences between will
and modals like must. Only the latter have a quantificational semantics
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and only the former are analysed via selection functions. But these
examples point to an analogy at a different level.
One natural way to account for the contrasts in (24)–(29) is that
different prejacents somehow force a different choice of modal bases
for the modals. For example, Condoravdi (2002) suggests that modal
claims whose prejacents have a reference time in the present rule out
non-epistemic modal bases via a constraint requiring that the modal
base be sufficiently diverse.23 In any case, the pattern in (24)–(29)
suggests that, whatever one says for the case of must will be exportable
to will.
6. Truth, validity, and indeterminacy
§5 offers a compositional semantic account of will, but does not fix the
truth conditions of will-claims. To get the latter, we must define a
notion of truth at a context. (This is the stage of the theory that
MacFarlane 2003 calls ‘postsemantics’.)
Adopting a definition of truth at a context requires us to take sides
in the debate about the indeterminacy of statements about the future.
To make the presentation more concrete, we adopt a specific account
of how indeterminacy affects the semantics, i.e. the one defended by
Barnes & Cameron (2009).24 According to this account, each context
determines a single actual world, but it is indeterminate which context
the utterance takes place in.
In a standard contextualist framework, built on Kaplan (1989), truth
at a context is defined by fixing the values of index parameters to the
23 This is the constraint endorsed by Condoravdi, roughly stated:
Diversity condition: If 0MODAL A1 has a non-epistemic modal base M, then there are
worlds w and v in M such that A is true at w and false at v
24 See also Iacona (2014), who sketches an Ockhamist picture whose treatment of indeter-
minacy is parallel to ours. Barnes & Cameron’s view is part of a broader family of views that
draw inspiration from supervaluational accounts of indeterminacy but retain a bivalent se-
mantics. For more work in this direction, see, among many, McGee & McLaughlin (1995);
Dorr (2003); Barnes & Williams (2011). We contribute to this tradition by showing that it
makes openness compatible with a standard Kaplanian picture of context and illuminates the
division of labour between the semantics and the metaphysics of the open future. A close
relative of our point of view is Wilson’s (2011) Kaplanian interpretation of the proposal in
Saunders & Wallace (2008). As Wilson puts it (p. 364), Saunders and Wallace’s background
assumptions ‘entail that where there are multiple complete branches, there are multiple con-
texts and hence multiple distinct utterances’. Though we are neutral on the relevant assump-
tions, we do think it is fruitful to think along these lines.
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coordinates of the context. (Following Lewis 1980, we take contexts to
be concrete situations of utterance.) Here is a formal definition:
Truth at a Context: A is true as uttered at c iff A½ ½ w;sc ;gc ¼ 1
In a slogan: S is true at a context c just in case S is true at the
circumstances fixed by c. Traditional supervaluationist accounts (for
example, Belnap & Green 1994) reject Kaplan’s definition of truth at a
context. They maintain that a context of utterance does not fix which
world is to count as actual. These accounts replace truth at a context
with a new definition that allows for sentences that are neither true
nor false at the context of utterance.25 Unlike traditional supervalua-
tionists, we endorse the simple definition of truth at a context given
above. Hence, on our account, every sentence is either true or false at a
context. (This part of our account is independent of our compos-
itional analysis of will, which is also compatible with a standard super-
valuationist postsemantics.)
How, then, can we satisfy the theorists who maintain that the future
is genuinely open? We assume that if the future is open, it is indetermin-
ate which context the utterance takes place in, and hence it is indeter-
minate which truth value the sentence has. An important consequence of
this hypothesis is that both the defender and the opponent of Openness
are able to help themselves to our framework, including the definition of
truth (and the two notions of validity that we give below). Their dis-
agreement is moved out of the semantic apparatus entirely: the defender
of Openness denies, and the opponent of Openness claims, that a con-
crete situation of utterance determines a unique context.
The notion of truth at a context is important for a number of
reasons. One of them is that (following Kaplan himself ) we can use
it to define a plausible notion of validity. On this notion, an argument
is valid just in case it preserves truth at a context: no context makes the
premises true and the conclusion false.
Validity1: A1; :::;An1 B iff, for any context c such that
A1; :::;An are true at c, B is also true at c.
We should flag an important consequence of our moving the inde-
terminacy outside the semantics: unlike traditional supervaluationism,
our logic for the relevant fragment of the language is allowed to be
straightforwardly classical. It will also be helpful to appeal to a second
25 For completeness, here is a sample definition of truth at a context that fits the traditional
supervaluationist’s desiderata: A is true as uttered at c iff for all worlds v that are historically
possible in c, A½ ½ v;sc ;gc ¼ 1:
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notion of validity, one that captures preservation of truth at a point of
evaluation.
Validity2: A1; :::;An2 B iff, for any triple w; s; g
 
such that
A1½ ½ w;s;g ¼ 1, …, An½ ½ w;s;g ¼ 1, B½ ½ w;s;g ¼ 1.
A single sentence A is valid1 just in case1 A; similarly for validity2.
Note that every argument that is valid2 is valid1. The converse how-
ever does not hold: any context that makes 0will A1 true, also verifies
A, but there are points at which willf A
  w;s;g ¼ 1, but A½ ½ w;s;g ¼ 0:
(This can happen only in points such that w =2 g f .) When A and B
are such that A1 B and B 1 A, we say that they are equivalent1
(similarly for equivalent2). Here too we have that every equivalent2
pair is equivalent1 (though not vice versa). These connections be-
tween these logical notions are important. Although validity1 (and
equivalence1) are more significant notions in the overall architecture
of the theory, we can establish them by way of establishing validity2
(and equivalence2).
7. Consequences for the logic of will
Having acquired a notion of validity, we are ready to explore the main
consequences of our apparatus. We start by vindicating our second
desideratum, i.e. the scopelessness of will. First, we notice that the
semantics satisfies the excluded middle property:
Will Excluded Middle: 0willf A _ willf not A1 is valid2 (hence
valid1).
We use ‘_’ for disjunction to highlight that the sentence is valid on the
assumption that or is boolean disjunction.26 The argument for
excluded middle also establishes a related fact:
Negation Swap: 0willf not A1 and 0not willf A1 are equivalent2
(hence equivalent1).
This explains why we do not perceive different scopes for negation
despite the fact that will is a modal.
26 PROOF: let w; s; g
 
be an arbitrary point of evaluation. We have that
0willf A _ willf not A1 is true at w; s; g
 
iff either A is true at s w; Fð Þ or false at s w; Fð Þ: But
the right-hand side of the biconditional is always true (since, for any set of worlds S and any
world w, it is always the case that w either belongs or doesn’t belong to it). Hence,
0willf A _ willf not A1 is true at w; s; g
 
. Since w; s; g
 
was arbitrary, 0willf A _ willf not A1
is true at any point of evaluation.
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The analysis also entails that will-conditionals satisfy a principle of
conditional excluded middle. Interestingly, this holds whether or not
conditionals in general satisfy this principle.
Compositional CEM for will-Conditionals: For any point w; s; g
 
,
If B
 
willf A
   w;s;g ¼ 1 or If B  willf not A
   w;s;g ¼ 1.
Note that this and all the following principles about conditionals are
restricted to the case in which the conditional antecedent is compat-
ible with the modal base.
Since Compositional CEM holds at any point of evaluation,27 we get:
Postsemantic CEM for will-Conditionals:
0 If B
 
willf A
  _ If B  willf not A
 
1 is valid2 (hence valid1).
Relatedly, there is only one way of negating the consequents of conditionals.
Narrow Negation Swap in Conditionals: 0 If B
 
willf not A
 
1
and 0 If B
 
not willf A
 
1 are equivalent2 (hence equivalent1).
This is a trivial consequence of the non-conditional negation swap,
because (if B ) merely operates on g . More importantly, we can derive:
Wide Negation Swap in Conditionals: 0 If B
 
willf not A
 
1
and 0not If B
 
willf A
 
1 are equivalent2 (hence equivalent1).
28
This completes our illustration of the basic logical implications of our
semantics.
8. Belief and doubt in will-claims
8.1 Probabilities of simple will-claims
Recall the cognitive problem from §2.3. Ordinary agents are uncertain
about the future. On one natural way of understanding this uncer-
tainty, this means that ordinary agents have non-extreme degrees of
belief in the propositions expressed by will-claims. Moreover, at least
in some cases, it seems that this uncertainty is rationally permissible, if
27 Whether 0 If B
 
willf A
 
1 is true at w; s; g
 
boils down to the truth of A at
w; s; g f  F \ B  : If it is not true, it must be false, but in that case, 0 If B  willf not A
 
1
must be true.
28 PROOF: not If B
 
willf A
   w;s;g ¼ 1 iff If B  willf A
   w;s;g ¼ 0 iff
willf A
   w;s;g f!F\B½  ¼ 0 iff not willf A
   w;s;g f!F\B½  ¼ 1 iff If B  not willf A
   w;s;g¼1.
Together with Narrow Negation Swap, this equivalence entails Wide Negation Swap.
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not rationally required. An adequate theory of will should vindicate
this intuition.
This problem should be distinguished from a different, important
problem surrounding belief in future claims. Suppose that the future
is objectively open, in the sense defined above. In particular, suppose
that branching theorists in the style of Thomason (1970), Belnap &
Green (1994), and Belnap et al. (2001) are right about the metaphysics
of branching: there are several possible futures, each of which shares
the segment that we occupy at the present time. In this case, it is
unclear what we mean when we say that the probability of an open
proposition—say, the proposition that Cynthia will wear a Warriors
cap tomorrow—is r . If it is genuinely open whether Cynthia will wear
a Warriors cap, then there are (at least) two ‘equally real’ futures. In
one of them she wears the cap, while in the other she does not. This
problem has received attention in philosophy of physics (in particular,
by defenders of the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics—
see, among others, Wallace 2014). We are not contributing to this
discussion here. Rather, we are taking for granted that it somehow
makes sense to assign non-extreme credences to propositions about
the future (and hence, derivatively, to the claims that express them).29
Let us then return to our Sports Fan example. Recall: every day,
Cynthia tosses a fair die and, on the basis of the outcome, decides
whether to wear a Giants hat, a Warriors hat, or no hat. Consider a
rational agent who assigns credence 1/3 to each of the three possibi-
lities. Against this background, what we want to show is that the
proposition expressed by (12) (repeated below) on our account also
gets credence 1/3.
(12) Cynthia will wear a Warriors cap tomorrow.
Before we start, let us remind you that this is a nontrivial task. In fact,
as we pointed out in §2.4, existing modal accounts fail this task. The
reason is that these accounts declare 0will A1 true just in case A is true
at every best future. This semantics makes (12) false, and hence pre-
dicts that a rational agent who is aware of the openness of the future
should assign credence zero to the proposition it expresses.
29 If you’re sceptical about these claims, you may take our arguments in this section to
provide a good litmus test for our semantics of will. What we’re going to show is that if our
theories of credences warrants assigning the attitudes that seem intuitive offhand, then the
semantics delivers contents that vindicate the intuitive assignment of credences.
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Let us spell out some basic assumptions. In keeping with standard
possible worlds semantics for attitudes, assume that credences are
defined over sets of worlds. In particular, assume that an agent’s cre-
dences at a given time may be modelled by a probability function m
satisfying the usual constraints. For example, let m model an agent’s
credences at the current point in time. Let m Að Þ ¼ 1=3, where A is the
set of worlds where Cynthia wears a Warriors cap. Our task is to check
that m PROPWð Þ ¼ 1=3, where PROPW is the content our semantics
associates to an utterance of (12).
For current purposes, we can take the content expressed by the ut-
terance of a will-sentence at a given context to be the set of worlds such
that the utterance is true as evaluated at those worlds. Formally:
Content of A at c: Ak kc ¼ w : A½ ½ w;sc ;gc ¼ 1
 	
In what follows, we suppress reference to the context to avoid clutter.
It is easy to see that this yields exactly the verdict we need. Take our
example: kCynthia will wear a Warriors capk is just the set of worlds
in which Cynthia wears a Warriors cap. On the assumption that the
credence that our agent assigns to Warriors-cap-worlds is 1/3, she will
also assign credence 1/3 to the proposition expressed by (12). More
generally, letting kBkF denote kBk \ F, we obtain:
Transparency: For any prejacent A, kwillf AkF ¼ kAkF.30
When we restrict consideration to the worlds in the modal base,
unembedded will-sentences and their prejacents are true at exactly
the same worlds.
8.2 Probabilities of complex will-sentences
The probabilities of Boolean compounds of will-sentences work out as
one would intuitively expect. Transparency and Negation Swap im-
mediately entail:
For all F, knot willf AkF¼ w : w is a ‰A-worldf g \ F ¼ knot AkF
In our example, kIt is not the case that Cynthia will wear a Giants
capk ¼ kCynthia will not wear a Giants capk. Both propositions have
probability 2/3 (according to m). Transparency entails similar results
30 PROOF: Suppose v 2 F. Then: v 2 willf A


 

 iff willf A
  v;s;g ¼ 1 iff A½ ½ s v;Fð Þ;s;g f!F½  ¼ iff
v 2 Ak k. The first equivalence follows from our definition of content; the second from the
truth conditions of will; the third from s v; Fð Þ ¼ v, which in turn follows from Centering and
v 2 F.
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for conjunction and disjunction, so that: kwillf A&Bð ÞkF ¼
kwillf AkF \ kwillf BkF and kwillf A _ Bð ÞkF ¼ kwillf AkF [ kwillf BkF.
The case of conditionals is more complex. It is well-known that
standard possible worlds semantics for conditionals fail to vindicate,
in general, the intuitive assignments of probabilities to conditional
sentences.31 Since our account of will incorporates a standard semantic
account of conditionals, it shares this feature. To get a sense of the
problem, consider again the Sports Fan scenario, and take the
conditional:
(30) If Cynthia wears a cap, she will wear a Warriors cap.
Recall that Cynthia decides to wear a Warriors cap, a Giants cap, or no
cap, depending on a random process that makes each of the three
options 1/3 likely. Accordingly, suppose that (30) is evaluated against
the toy modal base we described in §3, and consisting of a Warriors-
cap-world, a Giants-cap-world, and a no-cap-world. It seems natural
to say that your degree of belief in (30) should be (or, at the very least,
may be) 1/2. But our semantics can’t vindicate this result.
To see this, consider the content of (30):
kIf cap, willf Warriors capk¼
w : If cap;willf Warriors cap
  w;s;g ¼ 1 	 ¼
w : willf Warriors cap
  w;s;g f!F\cap½  ¼ 1
n o
¼
w : Warriors cap½ ½ s w;F\capð Þ;s;g f!F\cap½  ¼ 1
n o
A world belongs to this proposition if the selection function maps
to it when that world and the restricted modal base are given as input.
It is easy to show that the proposition in (30) cannot have probability
1/2. The basic point is that, given that in our model we have only three
worlds, each of which has probability 1/3, no proposition (i.e. no set of
worlds) can have probability 1/2.32
31 See Lewis (1979c), (1986b); Ha´jek & Hall (1994). It is often assumed that the intuitive
probabilities of conditional sentences should match the conditional probabilities of the con-
sequent, given the antecedent. But one doesn’t need to endorse this general thesis (which has
been called into question; see e.g. Kaufmann (2004)) to see the problem. All we need is that
there are examples in which such an assignment is plausible, such as (30) in the main text.
32 PROOF: The modal base contains three worlds: the Warriors-cap-world w, the Giants-cap-
world v, and the no-cap-world z; each has probability 1/3. w is a member of k 30ð Þk and v is
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One could respond that the problem depends on the fact that we
have used a modal base that is too simple. If we add enough worlds to
the modal base, we will be able to identify a content that gets prob-
ability 1/2. This is correct, but the point illustrated by our toy example
will still hold for some conditional or other, provided that we stick to
finite modal bases.33 Alan Ha´jek (1989, 2012) has pointed out that for
any (nontrivial and finite-ranged) probability function Pr , the condi-
tional probability values assigned on the basis of Pr outnumber the
unconditional probability values assigned by Pr. Hence there will
always be some conditional probability value that doesn’t find a
match in the probability of any proposition—exactly as happens in
our example, where no proposition has probability 1/2. (See also Hall
1994 for an extension of Ha´jek’s argument to the countable case.)
Before closing, let us gesture towards a way of refining our ideas
that will yield better results for conditionals. We build on a line of
thinking about conditionals that has been developed over the past
three decades (van Fraassen 1976; McGee 1989; Jeffrey & Stalnaker
1994; Kaufmann 2009, 2015; Bradley 2012; for some criticisms of
Kaufmann and an alternative approach see Khoo 2016). So far, we
have assumed that the credences of a rational agent are distributed
over an algebra of possible world propositions. But there is a second
dimension of uncertainty, which this model doesn’t capture: an agent
may be uncertain about which world is selected by the selection func-
tion. Go back to our example and consider the no-cap-world z. What
is the value of the selection function, when the relevant arguments are
z and the proposition that Cynthia wears a cap? Both the answers ‘The
Warriors-cap-world w ’ and ‘The Giants-cap-world v ’ seem to be open
epistemic possibilities. Being uncertain between these two answers, of
course, would mean being uncertain about which of two candidates
for the selection function (call them ‘sw ’ and ‘sv ’) is the ‘correct’ one.
not. The question is whether z is. This depends on the value of the selection function when z
is the input world. If s z; F \ capð Þ is w, then z is also a member of k 30ð Þk; otherwise, not. In
the former case, the probability of as (30) is 2/3; in the latter, 1/3. Either way, that probability is
different from 1/2.
33 It is controversial that modal bases of modals in natural language should be finite.
However, it is not implausible that the credences of ordinary subjects are only defined over
a finite number of subsets of the modal base, given standard cognitive limitations. For a more
realistic variant of Ha´jek’s argument, consider a subject whose credences are only defined over
a threefold partition of logical space, i.e. the one that includes the three propositions that
Cynthia wears a Giants cap, a Warriors cap, or no cap, plus the relevant Boolean combin-
ations. Depending on the selection function, this subject must have credence 1/3, 2/3, or
undefined credence in (30).
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To register this kind of uncertainty alongside uncertainty about
which world is actual, we need to refine the elements of the underlying
algebra. Rather than worlds, we may use pairs consisting of a world
and a selection function. This also involves modifying our notion of
content: we need to take contents to be sets of pairs of a world and a
selection function. (See Bradley 2012 for a more extensive development
of the idea; Bradley ’s approach is in the tradition stemming from van
Fraassen 1976. See also Jeffrey & Stalnaker 1994, and Kaufmann 2009,
2015).
2D content of at c: Ah ih i¼ w 0; s0h i : A½ ½ w 0;s0;gc ¼ 1 	
It is straightforward to see how, on the new picture, (30) may be
assigned probability 1/2. We now have an algebra of six possibilities,
consisting of the pairs:
w; swh i; v; swh i; z; swh i; w; svh i; v; svh i; z; svh if g
It is easy to show that a probability distribution that assigns to each of
these pairs probability 1/6 assigns probability 1/2 to (30).
9. Conclusion
Traditionally, will has been treated as a tense in philosophy, and as a
modal in large sectors of the linguistics literature. Linguists are right:
there is strong evidence that will is a modal. At the same time, all
existing modal theories fail to deliver some important desiderata. In
particular, they cannot be integrated with our intuitive attitudes to-
wards the future. We have suggested that will is indeed a modal, but
doesn’t have a quantificational semantics. Rather, will selects the ‘one
actual future’ out of the set of historical alternatives at the time of
utterance. Besides validating the evidence for the modal character of
will, this account predicts a range of important logical interactions for
will and dovetails well with intuitions about the cognitive role of future
statements—thus doing better than any other theory on the market.34
34 For conversations and exchanges we thank Bob Beddor, Michael Caie, Daniel Drucker,
Paul Egre´, Anastasia Giannakidou, Simon Goldstein, Valentine Hacquard, Magdalena
Kaufmann, Stefan Kaufmann, Chris Kennedy, Peter Klecha, Hanti Lin, Alda Mari, Sarah
Moss, Shyam Nair, Itai Sher, Patrick Shirreff, Daniel Skibra, Eric Swanson, Rich Thomason,
Robbie Williams. We also thank audiences at the 2015 AAP, LENLS 12, the University of
Chicago Workshop on Veridicality and Subjectivity, the 2015 Amsterdam Colloquium and
the 2016 Central APA, Cariani’s Fall 2015 Graduate Seminar at Northwestern and the
University of Leeds. Paolo Santorio acknowledges that his research leading to these results
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